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Patients cannot express themselves
Hable con ella 2002, Pedro Almodóvar
The problem
How can we evidence C in the absence of communication?
What is the minimum information we need?
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Yu et al, Brain. 2015
84y male
Frontal air-filled cavity Primary cerebellar agenesisTypical brain
24y female
Brown & Vahidassr, BMJ Case Reports 2018
We need a brain (all of it?)
How can we be conscious? (1)
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Laureys et al., Lancet Neurology, 2004 
(sleep data from Pierre Maquet; anesthesia data from Mike Alkire)
84y male
Frontal air-filled cavity Primary cerebellar agenesisTypical brain
We need a functional brain
How can we be conscious? (2)
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Bayne, Hohwy, Owen Trends Cogn Sci 2016
Defining Consciousness
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A moral imperative
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Do you think patients in a ... 














Demertzi et al, Prog Brain Res 2009
Demertzi & Racine et al, Neuroethics 2012
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Do they feel pain?
Laureys et al., Neuroimage 2002
Healthy controls        UWS patients
Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
Boly et al, Lancet Neurol 2008
Healthy controls               MCS patients
Minimally conscious state
Behaviour
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Terry Schiavo °1963, 
vegetative 1990, † 2005 USA
Behavioural signs




































Awareness ? = response to command or non-reflex movements
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Schnakers et al, Ann Neurol 2006; BMC Neurol 2009
n=103 post-comatose patients
45 Clinical diagnosis of VS
18 Coma Recovery Scale MCS
40% misdiagnosed
Standardized assessment Neuroimaging
Stender & Gosseries et al, Lancet 2014
We cannot always trust behavior
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Owen et al, Science 2006
Monti & Vanhaudenhuyse et al, NEJM 2010 Boly et al, Lancet Neurol 2008
Heine, Di Perri, Soddu, Laureys, Demertzi 
In: Clinical Neurophysiology in Disorders of 
Consciousness, Springer-Verlag 2015 
Demertzi & Laureys, In: I know what you are thinking: brain 
imaging and mental privacy, Oxford University Press 2012
Neuroimaging paradigms
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William James (1842-1910)
The stream of thought (Chapter IX)
The principles of psychology 1890
The stream of consciousness
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Some numbers…
• The human brain is approximately 2% of body’s weight
• 80% of this energy for neuronal signalling
à most of consumed energy used for function
• Stimulus & performance-evoked changes in brain energy 
consumption are surprisingly small (typically <5%)
While conscious awareness is a low bandwidth 
phenomenon and therefore energetically inexpensive, it 
is dependent upon a very complex, dynamically 
organized, non-conscious state of the brain that is 
achieved at great expense 
Raichle & Snyder. Intrinsic Brain Activity and Consciousness. In: Laureys S, Tononi G, editors. The Neurology of Consciousness. 
Oxford: Elsevier Academic Press; 2009. p. 81-48
Consciousness   |   Moral significance |   Assessing Consciousness   |  Ethics |  Conclusions
Task deactivations
Task performance - Rest (fixation/eyes closed) à Deactivations
Raichle & Snyder. Intrinsic Brain Activity and Consciousness. In: Laureys S, Tononi G, editors. The Neurology of Consciousness. 
Oxford: Elsevier Academic Press; 2009. p. 81-48
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Demertzi & Whitfield-Gabrieli, in: Neurology of Consciousness 2nd ed. 2015
Demertzi, Soddu, Laureys, Curr Opin Neurobiology 2013 
Demertzi et al, Front Hum Neurosci 2013
Raichle et al, PNAS 2001
The brain’s default mode at rest 
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Default mode network in DOC
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Fox et al, PNAS 2005
DMN anticorrelations
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Demertzi & Whitfield-Gabrieli, in: Neurology of Consciousness 2nd ed. 2015
Demertzi, Soddu, Laureys, Curr Opin Neurobiology 2013




or Default mode network
Switch 0.01-0.1Hz
DMN anticorrelations
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External-internal: r=-0.44, p<.02









FDR p<0.05 SVC  p<0.05
Vanhaudenhuyse*, Demertzi* et al, J Cogn Neurosci 2011
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Cognitive-behavioral relevance
Demertzi, Soddu, Faymonville et al, Prog Brain Res 2011
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Effect of arousal
Boveroux et al, Anesthesiology 2010
n=20
Propofol-induced 
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Post – Pre flight
Van Ombergen … and Demertzi, Sci Reports 2017
Demertzi et al, Brain Str Funct 2015
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Effect of environment












Di Perri, …, Demertzi*, Laureys*, Soddu*, Lancet Neurol 2017
Vanhaudenhuyse et al, Brain 2010
Effect of pathology
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Smith et al, PNAS 2009
Biswal et al., Magn. Reson. Med.1995
Task            Rest Task   Rest Task   Rest Task   Rest Task   Rest Task   Rest
Intrinsic Connectivity Networks


















































Healthy vs. all patients
Neuronal 85.3 .82 .87 Auditory, DMN
Single-patient classification
Number of subjects (%) with 
neuronal networks
0                        50                     100      
Long-range system connectivity disrupted
Demertzi & Gómez et al, Cortex 2014
Heine et al, Front Psychol 2012; Smith et al, PNAS 2009; Beckmann et al, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 2005
Consciousness   |   Moral significance |   Assessing Consciousness   |  Ethics |  Conclusions
Demertzi & Antonopoulos et al, Brain 2015























Auditory 8.32 1 <.001 25 18 43/45
Visual 7.79 2 <.001 23 15 38/45
Default mode 6.95 3 <.001 23 15 38/45
Frontoparietal 6.82 4 <.001 23 15 38/45
Salience 6.21 5 <.001 24 15 39/45
Sensorimotor 5.87 6 <.001 24 13 37/45
MCS> VS/UWS
Which network discriminates best?
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• Training set: 45 DOC (26 MCS, 19 VS/UWS)
• 14 trauma, 28 non-trauma, 3 mixed
• 34 patients assessed >1m post-insult
• Test set: 16 MCS, 6 VS/UWS (Mage: 43y, 15 non-trauma; all chronic), 
from 2 different centers  
Demertzi & Antonopoulos et al, Brain 2015
Classification MCS                                 Classification VS/UWS
Distance from decision plane
Demertzi & Antonopoulos et al, Brain 2015
Crossmodal connectivity classifies DOC
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RS stationary connectivity : 
• is linked to behavior and task performance (Laird et al,. J Cogn Neurosci 2011)
• reflects physiological & pathological unconsciousness (Heine et al, Front Psychol 2012)
• permits single-patient automatic diagnosis (Demertzi & Antonopoulos et al, Brain 2015)
Ongoing interactions among distinct brain regions 
(Hutchison et al, NeuroImage 2013)
But
it remains unclear to what extent it provides a 
representative estimate of cognition 
(Peterson et al, NeuroImage Clin 2015)
Stationary connectivity
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(Power et al. 2012), but rather than remove affected time points from
data (which would compromise the subsequent sliding window ap-
proach), we replaced outliers with the best estimate using a
third-order spline fit to the clean portions of the TCs. Outliers were
detected based on the median absolute deviation, as implemented in
3DDESPIKE (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). Improvement in the
root-mean-square of the temporal derivative over component TCs, re-
ferred to as “DVARS” in Power et al. 2012 (see Supplementary Fig.
S1A) and removal of anticipated motion-related biases from FC esti-
mates (see Supplementary Fig. S1B), suggest satisfactory correction of
motion artifacts. As a final step in postprocessing, we normalized the
variance of each TC, thus covariance matrices (below) correspond to
correlation matrices. In exploratory work, we repeated all analyses on
component TCs that underwent minimal postprocessing (only de-
trending and low-pass filtering) and found nearly identical results
with regard to FC temporal variability (Fig. 4) and connectivity states
(Fig. 5), suggesting that the somewhat aggressive postprocessing
applied here did not fundamentally alter dynamic structures.
FC Estimation and Temporal Variability
For each subject i = 1…M, stationary FC was estimated from the TC
matrix Ri as the C × C sample covariance matrix ∑i (Fig. 1B, left).
Dynamic FC was estimated with a sliding window approach, wherein
we computed covariance matrices ∑i(w), w = 1…W, from windowed
segments of Ri (Fig. 1B, right). We used a tapered window (see
Fig. 1B, right), created by convolving a rectangle (width = 22 TRs = 44
s) with a Gaussian (σ = 3 TRs) and slid in steps of 1 TR, resulting in
W = 126 windows. Because relatively short time segments may have
insufficient information to characterize the full covariance matrix, we
estimated covariance from the regularized precision matrix (inverse
covariance matrix, ∑i−1(w)) (Varoquaux et al. 2010; Smith et al.
2011). Following the graphical LASSO method of Friedman et al.
2008, we placed a penalty on the L1 norm of the precision matrix to
promote sparsity. The regularization parameter lambda (λ) was opti-
mized separately for each subject by evaluating the log-likelihood of
unseen data (windowed covariance matrices from the same subject)
in a cross-validation framework. Final dynamic FC estimates for each
window, ∑iL1(w), were concatenated to form ∑iL1, a C × C ×W array
representing the changes in covariance (correlation) between com-
ponents as a function of time. Both stationary and dynamic FC esti-
mates were Fisher transformed to stabilize variance prior to further
analysis.
FC estimates between some ICNs exhibited greater temporal varia-
bility than others (see Figs. 3 and 4A). We used a simple algorithm to
separate ICNs into groups with more variable FC (Partition 1, P1), re-
ferred to as the “zone of instability” (ZOI), and less variable FC (P2).
The algorithm proceeded with 3 steps: 1) ICNs were randomly as-
signed to P1 or P2 with equal probabilities, 2) in repeated iterations,
membership for a single component was changed in such a way to













where au,v is the average low-frequency (<0.025 Hz) amplitude of FC
oscillations between components u, v = 1, ... C1, σ2 is the standard
deviation over au,v, u; v [ P2, and h1, h2, are the number of com-
ponents in each respective partition, and 3) stopping criteria were
reached when any change in membership would result in a decrease
in SI. To obtain a robust partitioning solution that incorporated data
variability and was independent of initial conditions, we repeated the
algorithm on b = 1000 bootstrap resamples of the data, that is, M sub-
jects were drawn with replacement and au,v was recomputed as the
average over that sample. ZOI scores for each ICN (see Fig. 4B) were
then calculated as the fraction of repetitions in which the component
was assigned to P1.
Clustering Analysis
To assess the frequency and structure of reoccurring FC patterns we
applied the k-means clustering algorithm (Lloyd 1982) to windowed
covariance matrices. We used the L1 distance function (Manhattan dis-
tance), guided by work suggesting the L1-norm may be a more effec-
tive similarity measure than the L2 (Euclidean) distance for
high-dimensional data (Aggarwal et al. 2001). Only covariances
between the C1 = 50 ICNs were used in the clustering analysis, result-
ing in (50 × (50− 1))/2 = 1225 features. Prior to clustering, subject
Figure 1. Illustration of analysis steps. (A) Group ICA decomposes resting-state data from M= 405 subjects into C= 100 components, C1 = 50 of which are identified as
intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs). GICA1 back reconstruction is used to estimate the TCs (Ri) and SMs (Si) for each subject. (B) Stationary FC between components (left,
∑i) is estimated as the covariance of Ri. Dynamic FC (right, ∑iL1(w)) is estimated as the series of regularized covariance matrices from windowed portions of Ri.
Cerebral Cortex March 2014, V 24 N 3 665
Allen et al, Cereb Cortex 2014 
Liegeois t al, Nat Communic tions 2019
Stationary fc              Time-varying fc                   Dynamic
From stationarity to dynamics
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The brain cannot map the complexity of the internal and external world
(Dehaene et al, Trends Cog Sci, 2006; Tononi et al, Nat Rev Neurosci. 2016)
Barttfeld*, Ulhrig*,  Sitt*, et al, PNAS 2015
Unconsciousness:  rigid spatiotemporal 
organization, less metastable dynamics
• sleep (Tagliazucchi et al, PNAS 2013; Wang et al, PNAS 2016; Wilson 
et al., Neuroimage 2015; Chow et al, PNAS 2013)
• anesthesia
o in humans (Tagliazucchi et al, J. R. Soc. Interface 2016; 
Kafashan et al, Front Neural Circuits, 2016; Amico et al, PLoS One
2014)
o in animals (Barttfeld et al, PNAS 2014); Grandjean et al, 
Neuroimage 2017; Liang et al, Neuroimage 2015).
Typical wakefulness: significance for 
performance, emotion and cognition 
(Alavash et al, Neuroimage, 2016; Shine et al Neuron, 2016; Friston Neuroimage, 
1997; Thompson et al, Hum Brain Mapp, 2013)
Brain dynamics and cognition
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Demertzi & Tagliazucchi, Dehaene, Deco, Barttfeld, Raimondo, Martial, Fernández-Espejo, Rohaut, Voss, Schiff, Owen, Laureys, Naccache, Sitt.  
Science Advances 2019
Patterns of recurrent coordinated activity
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Demertzi & Tagliazucchi, Dehaene, Deco, Barttfeld, Raimondo, Martial, Fernández-Espejo, Rohaut, Voss, Schiff, Owen, Laureys, Naccache, Sitt.  
Science Advances 2019
Structure-function correlation
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Demertzi & Tagliazucchi, Dehaene, Deco, Barttfeld, Raimondo, Martial, Fernández-Espejo, Rohaut, Voss, Schiff, Owen, Laureys, Naccache, Sitt.  
Science Advances 2019
More chances to transition if in higher conscious state
Markov Process
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Demertzi & Tagliazucchi, Dehaene, Deco, Barttfeld, Raimondo, Martial, Fernández-Espejo, Rohaut, Voss, Schiff, Owen, Laureys, Naccache, Sitt.  
Science Advances 2019
Exploration is longer for complex patterns
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Do we measure consciousness?
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Why does it matter?
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Jox, Bernat, Laureys, Racine, Lancet Neurology 2012
Balancing costs-benefits
Results of Tests Beneficial Effects Harmful Effects
- brain activity than 
neurological examination
Relatives: decisions to limit life-
sustaining treatment
Relatives: may lose hope, 
purpose, and meaning in life
+ brain activity than
neurological examination
Clinical management: may be 
intensified by the chance of 
further recovery
Relatives: false hopes 
Same as neurological 
examination
Clinicians & relatives: may be 
affirmed in their decision about 
the level of treatment
Clinicians & relatives: may 
be disappointed & treatment 
cost/effectiveness
may be poor
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Gantner, et al, Fut Neurol 2013
Benefit for science
Cognitive-motor dissociation




Nizzi & Demertzi et al, Conscious & Cogn 2012           Nizzi, Blandin, Demertzi NeuroEthics 2018   
72%
28%
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Gosseries, Demertzi et al, Brain Injury 2012
n=523
Benefit for caregivers?
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• The moral significance of Consciousness
à ontological understanding: consciousness = personhood = moral agency
à relational or contextual understanding: patients have value for others 
• Legal challenges: responses to critical questions with NI
• Cognitive neuroscience is about brain/mind reading
à to what degree do we neuroscientists have the right to interfere with a 
patient’s intimacy, such as cognitive contents, in the absence of their consent?
à in essence, where do we draw the limits of deciphering another person’s 
cognitive content, like dreams, ongoing mentation etc? What is the additive 
value of it to a societal level?
Neuro-ethical considerations
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Conclusions
Consciousness needs a brain which:
• is intrinsically organized
• shows complexity
• shows dynamic flexibility
Consciousness as a collective consensus
Consciousness ….
Many thanks to
Coma Science Group & PICNIC Lab
The deparments of Neurology and Radiology in Liège & Paris
…and mostly 
patients and their families!
a.demertzi@uliege.be
ADemertzi
